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Abstract Network evolution Beyond 3G continues to domi-
nate discussion within the cellular community. A variety of issues
are being actively debated: requirement for a new air-interface,
greater interworking with WLAN and other networks, service-
driven approach, and potential for increasing market penetration
of network-enabled devices. The Mobile VCE vision for Beyond
3G encompasses a world that has embraced a disparate range of
networked processing and communications devices. This paper
presents an architecture for user-centric communication across
heterogeneous access networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is anticipated that in the future there will be a greater
proliferation of wireless processing devices. These devices will
include wireless enabled-laptops, PDAs and smartphones, to-
gether with new and innovative devices such as environmental
and biomedical sensors. Each will have its own distinct ca-
pabilities and characteristics such as screen size & resolution,
and the ability to support audio/video/other sessions. Thus,
users will own and control a plethora of diverse devices,
giving rise to the Personal Distributed Environment (PDE)
concept [1]. The PDE is a personal networking solution
aimed at providing access to a diverse range of services over
these multifaceted terminals. User devices are organized into
location-dependant (i.e. both local and remote) subnetworks;
PDE is the means by which services can be delivered to the
user over heterogeneous networks to these terminals. Unlike
many initiatives, the PDE takes a user-centric approach; it is
the user who manages the various subnetworks and controls
session delivery.
The vision of mass distribution of wireless devices is not
unique to PDE. Much research is being conducted on Ambient
Networking [2]; a concept that has many interpretations,
though context aware wireless connectivity is central to many
of them. A closely related concept is that of Sensor Networks
[3]: clusters of wireless interconnected sensors capable of
measuring a range of qualities such as temperature and air
pressure. Other research is focussing on the Mobile Grid: a
collection of wireless processing devices that cooperate to
share resources such as processor time and memory. More
recently, an IST 6th framework project, My personal Adaptive
NETwork (MAGNET), has also examined the concept of
personal networking. The central theme that underpins these
initiatives is that of ad hoc networking.
In tandem with the research into increased wireless con-
nectivity, interworking of access networks has received much
attention recently. Current advances in 802.11 Wireless LAN
(WLAN) technologies have motivated the standardization of
WLAN-UMTS interworking through 3GPP Release 6. In-
creased deployment of digital broadcast systems such as Digi-
tal Video Broadcasting (DVB) and Digital Audio Broadcasting
(DAB) has led industrial players to examine the possibility
of DxB-cellular interworking through initiatives such as the
DVB group: Convergence of Broadcast and Mobile Services
(CBMS).
It is the uniÞcation of these trends that gives rise to the PDE
concept pioneered by the Mobile Virtual Centre of Excellence
(MVCE) [4].
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows: Section
II provides an outline of the PDE Architecture, describing the
main entities and their roles. Section III presents discussion on
the physical location of the functional entity that manages a
subnetwork. Section IV examines the need for location privacy
within the PDE. Finally, Section V provides a summary and
outlines areas of future research.
II. PDE ARCHITECTURE
Based on the trends highlighted, it is clear that the user
will have access to a range of devices that are both local
and remote. Local devices are those located about the users
person, and remote devices are those owned/controlled by the
user but resident elsewhere. Within this context, it is assumed
that the user will not have a single communications device but
a diverse range of devices forming a Personal Area Network
(PAN), and that this network will accompany the user as he
moves around his environment. In addition, the user will have
a range of interconnected devices located variously within his
household or workplace. An example arrangement is shown
in Figure 1. The user may have a range of devices at other
locations, for example a wireless automobile network could
easily be included in the Þgure.
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network connectivity in a dynamic and heterogeneous envi-
ronment, irrespective of device location. Therefore, enabling
not only ubiquitous access to a users own personal devices
and network space, but also access to global communication
and information services.
The design of the architecture is constrained by the need
to ensure ubiquitous connectivity; this translates into a re-
quirement for a nominated contact point for each user with
a unique address, permitting a DNS-like lookup procedure to
readily return that address. Within the context of the PDE, this
entity is known as the Device Management Entity (DME). A
person-based URI is mapped to the IP address of the DME.
All session set-up requests irrespective of the their type (voice
call, email, etc.) are sent to this URI. Intelligent management
functionality resident within the DME preforms intelligent end
point determination for each service; this permits the most
appropriate device to be chosen to suit the session. The user-
centric nature of the PDE gives rise to the notion of a DME
containing much of the functionality of a user-based proxy.
The proxy operates on behalf of a single individual and is
based on the IETF Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [5]. The
idea is that the DME contains the functionality of a SIP proxy
and other additional functionality required to manage the PDE.
Given the assumption that the user will exercise control
over a variety of communication devices, SIP is an ideal
technology for a rendez-vous protocol that facilitates location
tracking, permitting the user to be contacted irrespective of
location. One of the unique aspects of the PDE is that it
encompasses both local (e.g. within the users PAN) and
remote (e.g. within the users household) devices. Thus, SIP
can be used to direct session set-up requests to the appropriate
device, based on user location and also device capabilities.
The session set-up requests from other parties can describe
the required characteristics of end terminals using the Session
Description Protocol (SDP) [6]. Within the architecture, a Call
Processing Language [7] acts as an interface between session
requests received via SIP and the information stored in internal
DME registers, as will now be explained.
Central to PDE provision is a controlling logical functional
entity known as the Device Management Entity, as shown in
Figure 2. This entity contains a number of functional subcom-
ponents, called registers, that assist in managing coordinated
device operation and service delivery within the PDE [8].
The equipment register is used to store device capabilities
and characteristics. A number of security issues are prevalent
in distributed networks such as the PDE; the security register
stores encryption keys for devices and security policies for the
PDE as a whole.
The PDE may be viewed as a composite of several phys-
ically separate subnetworks; in particular some of those net-
works may exhibit high mobility proÞles: e.g. the automobile
network and the PAN. Thus, mobility management within the
PDE requires a tracking entity. This task is performed by a
DME subcomponent known as the location register: a com-
ponent that provides a service analogous to the SIP location
service. Implementation of the location service is not speciÞed
by the SIP speciÞcation and can therefore be implemented
using other appropriate technologies. The Berkeley database
has been used to implement the location register; it is also
being used to implement the other registers. Interaction with
the database is conducted through the Lightweight Directory
Access Protocol (LDAP) [9]. Conveniently, both database and
access protocol are included in the open source software
component, openLDAP. The DMEs and their registers were
therefore implemented using openLDAP on a Mandrake 9.0
Linux platform.
In order to minimize the amount of signalling across the var-
ious networks that the PDE transcends, a portion of the DME
is devolved to each subnetwork to permit local management,
as shown in Figure 2. Thus, each subnetwork is permitted to
operate in a semi-autonomous fashion. However, data stored
in each of the local DMEs is cached within the root DME.
This two-level approach is beneÞcial since:
1) When a device wishes to determine the capabilities of a
device in its own subnetwork, it contacts its local DME,
reducing the need to communicate with the root DME
directly. This is advantageous because the root DME
will generally be further away; the increased hop count
will result in increased latency. Moreover, communication
with a local device may allow utilization of non-tariff
based links.
2) When a device wishes to determine the capabilities
of a device in another subnetwork, it is redirected by
its local DME to the root DME, which has visibility
of the characteristics of all devices. Thus, signalling is
constrained to be local, where possible. This redirection,
also known as referral, is preferred over a chaining
approach in implementation. Chaining, where, the local
DME would pass on the request on behalf of the device
is beset by security problems.
The PAN section of the PDE will encounter a range of
foreign devices by virtue of its mobility. These could be
either other users wireless-enabled devices or public wireless
devices with integrated services that users may wish to utilize
opportunistically. When the PAN encounters a foreign device,
it may be added to its local DMEs internal registers such that
devices within the PAN may access that foreign device/service.
Many of these public devices will be designed to provide
local services, e.g. a wireless-enabled machine at a railway
station may provide travel tickets. The salient point is that local
services will only be of value to the user when in the vicinity
of those device/service. Based on the assumption that local
user devices are more likely to interact with local services,
foreign devices and services need only be mapped locally,
i.e. in the local DME. This approach has the potential to
minimize signalling of topological changes to other sections of
the PDE, hence reducing the requirement for signalling over
the wireless links that may incur a high tariff. The tree-like
nature of LDAP permits the characteristics of devices located
in different subnetworks to be stored in different branches
under an organizational unit (ou), as shown in Figure 3. This
technology facilitates delegation of authority to manage this
information to the respective subnetworks.
The hierarchical PDE architecture [1] has evolved based on
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the root DME, and local DMEs that are resident in each of the
PDE subnetworks. Section III examines the physical location
of the local DME.
III. PHYSICAL LOCATION OF LOCAL DME
Within each PDE subnetwork, local DME functionality
will reside on one of the devices. In wireless subnetworks
(with dynamic topology) it would be advantageous if the host
could change to reßect variations in residual battery power or
topology. Topological changes that may require a change of
host include addition of a new node or subnetworks becoming
co-located, i.e. resident at the same location. The former
implies that a new node may be better able to support the
DME management functionality. The latter implies that two or
more wireless subnetworks belonging to the same user occupy
the same radio environment; in this circumstance one copy
of the management functionality may become redundant. An
automated algorithm is used to identify the most appropriate
device to host the local DME functionality; note the DME is
not a form of piconet controller that controls access to the radio
medium, rather it is a higher layer functional management
entity. Nonetheless, the algorithmic approach to determining a
suitable host for the DME has similarities to piconet controller
selection mechanisms. The algorithm could consider such
factors as availability of power1, processing power, memory
constraints, and optionally connectivity2. However, the abun-
dance of powerful personal computing devices, both within the
household and workplace, is such that processing, memory and
energy constraints are unlikely to be an issue for these devices.
Therefore, the selection of a device to host the local DME
in the Þxed subnetworks is unlikely to be problematic. The
same cannot be said, however, for the mobile subnetworks:
energy capacity is a signiÞcant limiting factor due to the
limited battery life of mobile devices. Successive generations
of mobile handsets and PDAs have been accompanied by
increased processing ability and storage capability. Based on
this trend, it is unlikely that these constraints will be the
limiting factor.
Although available processing power and storage capacity
in a mobile device may be subject to temporal variation, it is
residual battery power that will be the most dynamic. Based
on this premise, the choice of the most suitable device to host
the DME in a wireless network may vary with time; this poses
the signiÞcant problem of how to determine the most suitable
host. For implementation purposes it was decided to focus on
selection algorithm based on residual energy.
Within the algorithm, the best candidate is deÞned as the
node which has the highest level of residual energy. Each
node that has sufÞcient processing power and storage capa-
bilities (based on predetermined threshold values) broadcasts
its estimated battery life on all local interfaces. The broadcast
will take the form of a packet that contains the candidates
1Clearly devices that have access to a Þxed supply are preferable to devices
relying on battery power. Similarly, devices with large residual battery power
are preferable to those with little remaining power.
2Ability to communicate directly with other devices within the subnetwork,
particularly over heterogeneous links.
address (or range of addresses for a multimode device), a
global PDE identiÞer, a handover ßag, the estimated battery
life, a magic number3, and a time-to-live count. The packet
may be encrypted so as to prevent other wireless devices
from intercepting transmissions. On reception of the broadcast
packet, the other devices in the subnetwork decrement the
time-to-live counter. If the counter value is non-zero then the
packet is re-broadcast on all available local interfaces. Where
a device has multiple interfaces it may receive multiple copies
of the packet. In this case the device can use the magic number
to determine whether it is the same packet or another packet:
loop detection; clearly, a node will not broadcast a packet
that it has broadcast previously. In this way each device in
the subnetwork is made aware of the DMEs location, i.e. the
MAC address of the DMEs host device within the subnetwork.
The maximum number of times that the broadcast packet
need be transmitted can be determined. For a network con-
taining N devices (D1 −DN), where each device has In local
interfaces, then the number of broadcast packets is given by:
Pkts =
N∑
n=1
In (1)
All nodes in the subnetwork are able to receive these
broadcasts; when the handover ßag is set, the candidate with
the longest battery life is regarded as the most suitable device.
The successful candidate will assume the role of DME host
and will commence periodic transmission of beacon packets.
Beacon packets are deÞned as broadcast packets with the
handover ßag reset. The purpose of the broadcast packets is
two-fold. Other devices use these to determine the address
of their local DME - when the handover ßag is zero. Their
secondary purpose is to allow other candidate hosts to continue
monitoring their residual power and compare it with that
broadcast - when the handover ßag is 1. If the incumbent host
falls below an acceptability threshold (i.e. a residual energy
threshold) and another candidate has a signiÞcantly better
projected battery life then it replies by transmitting its estimate
to the incumbent host. For another device to be considered as
better, two conditions must exist: the incumbent breaches its
minimum energy threshold, and the candidate has a battery
life greater than that of the incumbent plus a hysteresis
margin. This approach is adopted in order to avoid unnecessary
handover of the DME hosting role, which is undesirable since
handover involves transferring computer code and data to the
successor, incurring a cost in terms of power & bandwidth
consumption. Estimation of battery life may be subject to
measurement error; therefore, the hysteresis margin is required
to prevent ping-pong handovers. If the incumbent host is able
to support the DME despite the presence of another more
suitable candidate, a handover is not required. Opting not to
handover in this circumstance avoids the cost associated with
handover. It is for this reason that a minimum power threshold
must be breached before handover is triggered.
In order to determine the performance of the algorithms and
techniques 2 metrics will be used, For a simulation consisting
3A random number generated by nodes and inserted into a packet to enable
loop detection.
4of a set, N , of x nodes such that N = {n1...nx}, a set T of
their respective lifetimes is obtained T = {t1...tx}. The set T
is used to calculate the metrics.
1) Mean Node Lifetime (m1): this is the mean value taken
across all node that form the ad hoc network:
m1 =
x∑
i=1
Ti
x
(2)
2) Network Lifetime (m2): this is the time that the entire
ad hoc network is still operational without any node
failures due to battery power. Since the network will no
longer be regarded as fully operation on the failure of a
single node, then this metric translates into the shortest
lifetime of all nodes in the simulation.
m2 = min(T ) (3)
Since handover selection is triggered whenever the current
DME falls below the energy threshold value, it follows that
when all nodes are below that value the network will be in a
condition of permanent DME selection. The signalling trafÞc
this incurs leads to rapid energy consumption on all nodes. It
is worth noting that energy consumption results not just from
transmission of (signalling) packets but also from reception.
A device will consume battery energy every time it transmits
a packet. Additionally, every device within radio range of the
transmitter will consume energy in order to decode it, and
these devices will process the packet in one of two ways. If
the device is the intended recipient it will decode the layer-2
frame and pass it up the IP stack for further processing; if it is
not the intended recipient, it will decode the frame, examine
the address, then discard it: a process known as overhearing.
Studies of 802.11-based networks have shown that energy
consumed during reception is almost equal to that consumed
during overhearing [10] at low transmission power levels, e.g.
1mW.
It is therefore important to recognise the effect of threshold
value on battery life:
• High threshold values lead to short node life. This is the
result of continual controller selection once all nodes are
below the threshold. Before this occurrence, a handover
is triggered relatively infrequently and therefore the asso-
ciated energy overhead is small. The higher the threshold
value, the sooner all nodes are below that value. Since
handovers are triggered whenever the controller node is
below the threshold value, continual controller selection
(and hence signalling) results.
• Low threshold values lead to high variation in node
lifetime. This is because handover only occurs when the
Þrst node to become the local DME has almost exhausted
its energy reserves.
In a network where all nodes are within radio range of each
other (i.e. a fully interconnected mesh), it is clear that the state
of continual leadership elections will lead to catastrophic effect
in terms of battery life. To prevent this situation a dynamic
threshold value is required. Consequently, another algorithm
is required to determine the new value of this threshold.
Four approaches have been simulated and assessed:
• Fixed Percentage: The handover threshold is set to a Þxed
percentage (say 90%) of its previous value.
• Percentage Of Mean: The handover threshold is set to a
Þxed percentage of the mean residual energy of all nodes.
• Percentage Of Median: The handover threshold is set to
a Þxed percentage of the median residual energy of all
nodes.
• Percentage Of Minimum: The handover threshold is set
to a Þxed percentage of the lowest residual energy of all
nodes.
Each of the four cases have been evaluated and compared.
Their performance is assessed with the metrics described in
Equations 2 & 3 across a range of Þxed percentages. In all
four cases the Þrst iteration is triggered to occur at 90% of
the energy level of the nodes. Thereafter, the threshold is
adjusted according to the appropriate algorithm. Common to
all these approaches is that the new threshold value is set
to a percentage or fraction of either the previous value or a
measure of node energy. This is achieved by multiplying the
measure by a constant factor between 0 and 1: this factor will
be referred to as the Constant Fractional Multiplier (CFM).
Simulation revealed that each of the four approaches, for
a range of CFM values, led to similar results in terms of
node and network lifetime; the difference between the best
and worst performing scheme was typically less than 1%, even
when the nodes had nonuniform initial energy values as shown
in Figures 4 & 5. The simulations did reveal, however, that the
correct choice of CFM could extend mean node lifetime by
4% and network lifetime by 16%. If it is of critical importance
to keep all devices in the network alive as long as possible
then a high value of CFM should be chosen in the region of
0.85. If the objective is to keep only one device in the network
alive as long as possible then a small value of CFM should
be chosen, in the region of 0.1. High values of CFM lead to
more frequent handover selections and this distributes the load
of hosting the local DME more evenly across the devices in
the subnetwork. Low values of CFM should be chosen since
fewer handover selections lead to lower energy consumption
as a result of the signalling entailed. In this case handover is
only preformed when the current host is close to power failure.
This results in signiÞcant variations in device lifetimes within
the network, but has the advantage that one of the devices will
have a long lifetime.
A related issue concerns the procedure to be adopted
whenever two PDE subnetworks become co-located. There
may be several instances throughout a typical day where a
user enters/leaves his home/car/workplace. If the user is also
accompanied with a PAN, then the PAN may merge with the
subnetworks already at these locations, assuming they have a
wireless interface. It is necessary to deÞne network merging
within this context. Each local DME can be regarded as a
directory server (in addition to many other roles) for the
devices in its neighborhood (PDE subnetwork). When two
or more subnetworks become co-located and can therefore
communicate directly via short range wireless technologies,
it may be more efÞcient to manage the combined network by
a single controlling entity (local DME). When the local DME
of one subnetwork assumes control over the devices of another,
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a single DME is derived from battery power conservation,
and increased knowledge base. The former implies that it
is more power efÞcient for a single device to be assigned
that task of managing a network than to have several devices
performing this task in parallel. The latter implies that better
decision making is possible by a single DME with access to
full information with the subnetwork than by two or more
DMEs with access to a subsection of information.
As mentioned DME hosts periodically broadcast packets
detailing their appropriateness to host the DME. Therefore,
when PDE subnetworks become co-located, both hosts will
be able to receive each others packets. On mutual reception
of packets, that with the longer battery life (plus hysteresis
margin) is identiÞed as the most appropriate host. However, it
is not necessary to merge both DMEs immediately. It is pro-
posed that merging of DMEs is postponed until a predeÞned
time period has elapsed. The purpose of this time period is
to avoid merging and disjoining of local DMEs when PDE
subnetworks become co-located for short time periods such
as a short car journey. During this period the subnetworks
will continue to be managed independently. After this period,
however, it is proposed that a single DME entity manages the
conjoined subnetworks.
Merging of DME logical entities is achieved as follows. The
DME host that does not have precedence, i.e. has the lower
battery life, indicates that it is willing to handover copies of
its registry information to the DME host with precedence. On
receipt of an acknowledgement, copies of the records held in
the registries are transmitted. It should be noted that the former
DME host does not depopulate its database; rather it simply
stores it but no longer operates as a DME. The rationale for
retaining this information is that it may be needed in the near
future if the PDE subnetworks become disjoined again.
Within PDE a range of security issues are being examined:
Digital Rights Management (DRM), trust of foreign entities,
Single Sign-On mechanisms (SSO), and location privacy.
DRM mechanisms are required to permit the user to transfer
content across their devices but not to others devices with-
out payment. Trust management is required for opportunistic
communication; should a PDE device trust another device or
service provider if it has no previous experience of that device?
SSO permits the PDE to authenticate to many access networks
by authenticating with only one of them; this also facilitates
aggregated billing mechanisms. The transfer of signalling
trafÞc between local and root DME entities may reveal the
users location to other parties. Indeed, monitoring a media
session could also reveal a users end point. Thus, location
privacy is an important consideration in Personal Networking.
The issue of location privacy is discussed in Section IV.
IV. LOCATION PRIVACY
Since each of the PDE subnetworks is physically separate,
they will exchange signalling information over intermediate
networks: UMTS networks, WLAN networks, and ISP/telcos.
Clearly, within the intermediate networks there exists the
possibility that a users location privacy requirements could
be violated using trafÞc analysis. In fact, it is not possible in
any such system to completely obscure location information.
However, within the PDE there exists an additional danger
to the PDEs location register [11]. Accurate knowledge of
the PDEs topology relies on the location register being
supplied with true information. From a security perspective,
this highlights the need to ensure that the database is not
supplied with misinformation regarding topological changes.
The misinformation may arise from two sources: malicious
devices/users, and malfunctioning devices/networks. With the
former case, a malicious source may attempt to deliberately
mislead the location register as to the true topology of the
PDE. For example, it may attempt to inform the location
register that the devices residing in a user-based PAN are
erroneously contactable through a WLAN network (with sup-
plied gateway address). Based on this information the root
DME is misled with regards to the true contact information
of the PAN. Of course, the malicious entity need not be a
source, rather it could be an entity resident in an intermediate
network that tampers with originally correct information. This
is undesirable since it would result in a section of the PDE (in
this case the PAN) becoming detached from the rest (out of
contact with the PDE). With the latter case, a malfunctioning
node may attempt to update its own topological database but
unwittingly sends the information to the wrong destination
(i.e. wrong DME address). Alternatively, a malfunctioning
network may route accurately addressed information to the
wrong destination: stray messages. In this case, it is possible
that a section of a users PDE becomes conjoined with that of
another user.
Both cases indicate that interception (substitution) of loca-
tion information traversing the PDE can lead to sections of
the PDE becoming detached from the rest (denial of service),
or perhaps sections of another PDE becoming erroneously
attached. Thus, interception of location information may have
the effect of destabilizing the entire PDE. Clearly, there is
a need for robust security mechanisms to operate between
the root DME and its local components resident in each PDE
subnetwork.
In order to preserve the topological integrity of the PDE,
a strong encryption mechanism is required to provide mutual
device authentication. A two phase procedure is envisaged,
as depicted in Figure 6, whereby the local and root DMEs
mutually authenticate, followed by each of the PDE devices
mutually authenticating with a nominated local DME. The
Þrst phase operates as follows. The local DME sends an
authentication request (auth) to the root DME, this implicitly
requests the creation of a session key between the two. The
request is accompanied with a random number (RNDa), the
local DMEs ID, together with time information that consists
of a timestamp and a suggested duration of validity of the
session key; the time information is required to prevent replay
attacks. It is assumed that both the root DME and local DME
devices have sufÞcient computational power to permit Public
Key Cryptography to be implemented, and that the root DME
has a public (Kpubroot) and private (Kprivroot) key pair. The
authentication request is encrypted using the public key, as
shown in message 1.
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private key and responds (message 2) with the same time
info, random number, authentication request identiÞer, and
session key (Klr). All of this is encrypted by the local DMEs
public key, Kpubloc. By including the random number in this
transaction, the root DME indicates that it has the private key
and in doing so authenticates itself to the local DME. The
local DME then authenticates to the root DME by transmitting
an acknowledgement (message 3) encrypted using the session
key contained in message 2. Finally, the root returns (message
4) an authentication token, Kprivroot{Klpuboc : validity}. The
authentication token is the local DMEs public key and validity
information signed by the private key of the root DME. In
this context validity information contains the ID of the local
DME, and timing information to reveal the period for which
the token can be used in order to prevent replay attacks. The
local DME can use this token later to prove to other devices
that it has previously been authenticated by the root DME. If
the local DME has no prior knowledge of the other N devices
in its subnetwork, it can request (message 5) a copy of their
public keys4 encrypted using the session key. The root DME
subsequently responds (message 6) with a list of keys (public
or secret), Kpub1 to KpubN.
Phase two involves mutual authentication between local
DME and the device in its subnetwork; it is assumed there are
N such devices. The local DME transmits a broadcast message
(message 7) to all N devices indicating that it is the local DME.
Each device responds with a request to register (reg) with the
local DME. Message 8 shows just such a response from a
particular device, device X. A similar procedure is adopted
to that in phase one where the request is accompanied with
ID data and timing information to prevent replay attacks. This
information is encrypted using the local DMEs public key,
Kpubloc. The local DME is able to decrypt this request using
its private key. The local DME then authenticates itself to
the device by responding (message 9) with the authentication
token, timing information, and a session key to be used
between the device and the local DME (K ldx). The device
is able to decrypt this message using its private key. Analysis
of the authentication token veriÞes that the local DME has
authenticated to the root DME and is therefore part of the
PDE. The device is then able to authenticate to the local DME
(message 10) by returning an acknowledgement encrypted
using the session key, Kldx.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In a future populated by many more wireless devices, giving
the user a seamless environment will place a high demand on
the management system.
User based mobility management is an important area of
research to enable ubiquitous connectivity across a range of
terminals. The vision of PDE is centered around the notion
of ubiquitous, seamless, and always-on personal networking
across both wired and wireless device/networks. It must be
4Note: it is recognized that not all PDE device will have sufÞcient
computational power to support PKC; therefore, these devices may have a
secret key instead.
easy to use and conÞgure by everyone regardless of their tech-
nical expertise. The PDE requires robust mobility management
to operate in concert with feature discovery mechanisms to
handle the challenges of wireless ad hoc environments and
enable the provision of optimum service support.
Whilst heterogeneous access increases the complexity of
choices and conÞgurations to the management system, in the
PDE it is recognized that there is a clear need to hide this
complexity from the user. This may be achieved through the
use of a third party provider that may host, conÞgure and
manage the PDE on the users behalf.
This paper has proposed a two-level hierarchical manage-
ment system based on local controllers resident in each subnet-
work subservient to a central controller. Each local controller
has jurisdiction over the devices in its network. The reasoning
behind this approach is to localize signalling and provide fast
access to local information. In keeping with this structure an
LDAP schema has been designed and implemented to maintain
details of the status and characteristics of each device in
each subnetwork. The structure of LDAP is ideal for such
distributed applications.
Simulation studies have been conducted to assess the perfor-
mance of various algorithms in selecting the most appropriate
device in a subnetwork to host the local controller. The results
of the simulation demonstrate that for an energy threshold-
based reselection schemes there is little difference in perfor-
mance; therefore, the simplest scheme is most appropriate.
Such a scheme would involve a dynamic threshold that is
decreased by a percentage of its previous value once all
devices are below that threshold.
As with all distributed networks, security is an area of
prime importance. Research in PDE is actively examining
the approaches being undertaken in other fora, and translating
them to Þt PDE requirements.
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